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The Global Economy and
the American Welfare State
HOWARD JACOB KARGER
Louisiana State University
School of Social Work
The American social welfare state is approaching a crisis because of the
global economy. Survival in a new world economy requires corporations
to become more efficient, a strategy which leads to a rapidly changing
technology, plant shutdowns, and industrial reorganization. To aid cor-
porations, government often curbs taxes to make capital available for
investment. These policies can lead to governmental debt, reduced wel-
fare services, a deterioration in the infrastructure, and myriad social
problems. This article investigates the effects of the global economy on
the American welfare state.
The concept of a welfare state is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon. Before the middle 1930s, the majority of countries
had only rudimentary forms of social security. However, by
the 1950s most industrialized nations had developed compre-
hensive health care programs, unemployment compensation,
state-sponsored pensions for the elderly, and various income
maintenance support programs.
Grounded in John Maynard Keynes' (1936) theory of de-
mand-side economics, welfare states in Western industrialized
nations grew rapidly from the 1950s to the early 1970s. How-
ever, by the middle 1970s economic malaise, in the form of high
inflation, high rates of unemployment, slow economic growth,
and unacceptably high levels of taxation began to character-
ize Western industrial economies. During these difficult times,
governments were forced to reassess their economic strategies,
including the resources allocated to welfare activities. Through-
out the late 1970s and 1980s, most Western governments either
arrested or reduced their welfare programs.
The welfare state is confronting a serious crisis. Forced to
survive in a highly competitive global economy, corporations
and government are compelled to become more efficient. For
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corporations, this can lead to economic restructuring, which
in turn often leads to a rapidly changing technology, plant
shut-downs, and major industrial reorganization. To increase
the competitive position of its domestic industries, government
is forced to lower corporate and personal taxes to free up money
for investment. The subsequent loss of revenue leads to a heavy
governmental debt, a reduction in welfare services, a deterio-
ration in the public infrastructure, and myriad social and eco-
nomic problems. This situation is exacerbated as governmental
cuts are met by increased demands for social services stemming
from global-based changes. This article investigates the emer-
gence of the global economy and its effects on the American
welfare state. Also examined are three scenarios relating to the
future of the welfare state in a competitive world economy.
The Emerging Economic Order
The new world economy is marked by shifting demographic
trends and novel socio-political arrangements. For example,
close to 75% of the world's population live in poorer nations,
most in the Southern hemisphere. As recently as the middle
1960s, economies in developing nations primarily manufactured
basic goods (e.g., clothing, shoes, toys, and simple and inex-
pensive consumer electronics) requiring cheap labor and rela-
tively simple technologies. However, by the 1970s, Japan, Korea,
and Taiwan began exporting products which called for sophis-
ticated and capital-intensive modes of production. Although
second-tier industrial countries such as India, the Philippines,
and China were able to inherit the basic goods production of the
industrialized Asian nations, they too, were forced into
adopting more sophisticated technologies. By the middle 1970s,
Western nations began to experience the affect of this new eco-
nomic competition as their manufacturing industries declined,
their growth rates flattened, and their unemployment increased
(Reich, 1987).
The effects of this new economic order are illustrated by
examining the United States. Once the world's undisputed eco-
nomic leader, the U.S. is now struggling to maintain an eco-
nomic presence in a highly competitive world economy (Bowles,
Gordon, & Weisskopf, 1983). In 1980 the United States had a
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$2 billion trade surplus; by 1984 other countries were gradu-
ally catching up with its productivity and that surplus turned
into a deficit of $102 billion (Thurow, 1985). To maintain pros-
perity and finance an increasingly (if relatively) unproductive
economy, the U.S. turned to massive foreign borrowing. In 1982
America had net foreign assets of $152 billion; by 1986 it sur-
passed Brazil to become the world's largest debtor nation.
The economic problems of the U.S. are compounded by sev-
eral factors. From 1960 to 1980, America's share of the world's
manufactured exports fell from 25% to 17%. By 1988 the United
States had dropped to the third largest exporter ($320 billion),
behind West Germany ($323 billion) and ahead of Japan ($256
billion). Even with a 27% increase in exports in 1988 (due mainly
to a drop in the dollar), America imported $460 billion worth
of goods, making it the world's largest importer (International
Monetary Fund, 1989). (In comparison, Germany imported $251
billion in 1988 and Britain $189 billion.) By the early 1980s the
United States imported 50% of its consumer electronics, 30%
of its automobiles, and a large proportion of cameras, shoes,
tools, tires, machinery, and clothes (Magaziner & Reich, 1982).
Apart from the trade deficit, another striking imbalance exists.
In terms of dollar value, Japan's number one export to the U.S.
is motor vehicles, followed by heavy equipment, iron and steel
plates, and consumer electronics. In contrast, the leading ex-
ports of the United States to Japan are soybeans, corn, fir and
hemlock logs, coal, wheat, and cotton (Bluestone & Harrison,
1982). In essence, the United States has become an agriculture
exporter trying to compete in a global economy.
According to Lester Thurow (1985), the roots of the eco-
nomic crisis are found in the loss of the technological edge held
by American industry in the 1950s and 1960s. Thurow main-
tains that American industry is now facing competitors who
have matched and surpassed its economic achievements. This
dilemma is exacerbated as America is thrust into a competitive
world economy while at its most vulnerable economic point
since World War II (Thurow, 1985).
Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone (1988) accept that
global competition has propelled the economic crisis, but they
argue that instead of going back to basics-improved product
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quality, investment in new technology, and more constructive
relationships with workers-American corporations responded
by abandoning core businesses, investing offshore, shifting
capital into highly speculative ventures, subcontracting with
low-wage contractors both domestically and abroad, and substi-
tuting part-time workers for full-time employees. The economic
crisis in America is manifested in other structural problems.
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) document the deindustrializa-
tion of America, or in other words, the widespread and sys-
tematic disinvestment in the nation's productive capacity. They
argue (1982) that "the essential problem with the U.S. economy
can be traced to the way capital-in the forms of financial re-
sources and of real plant and equipment-has been diverted
from productive investment.., into unproductive speculation,
mergers and acquisitions, and foreign investment" (p. 135). In-
deed, high-income production jobs declined by 1.4 million be-
tween 1970 and 1982 (Day, 1989). Permanent job losses in Ohio
included a 20% loss in primary metals manufacturing, a 10%
loss in electronic equipment manufacturing, and a 19% loss
in transportation equipment manufacturing. The loss of high-
paying manufacturing jobs corresponds to increased poverty in
the traditional industrial states. In Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
and New York the poverty rates climbed from 10.4% in 1978
to 13.4% in 1985; in Michigan, Ohio and Illinois they went up
from 10% to 14% (Day, 1990). In the wake of deindustrialization
lay empty factories, displaced workers, bankrupt communities,
and widespread social dislocation. The human misery resulting
from global economic changes has put immense pressure on
the welfare state.
The Affects of the Global Economy
on the American Welfare State
Within the context of the global economy there are two in-
terrelated issues that affect the welfare state: the actual trends in
the global economy, and the adoption of policies believed nec-
essary to ensure economic survival. Two conservative writers
on the global economy, Alvin Rabushka of the Hoover Insti-
tution and Steve Hanke (1989) of Johns Hopkins University,
have outlined the requirements for success in the new economic
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community: (a) a laissez-faire economic approach emphasizing
free trade and markets, no tariffs, and a commitment to the
free movement of capital; (b) an emphasis on research and de-
velopment; (c) dramatic reductions in corporate and progressive
income taxes; (d) a decrease in governmental regulations and in
the power of regulatory agencies; (e) privatizing the economy
by selling off publicly owned industries, utilities, and trans-
portation systems; (f) reducing the role of government in the
marketplace, including slashing or eliminating public employ-
ment programs; and (g) a decrease in welfare activities, includ-
ing major cuts in entitlement programs.
These economic schemes have clearly devolved from Rea-
ganomics. Taking their cue from supply-side theorists, conser-
vative supporters of the global economy argue that it has the
potential to provide untold affluence for countries willing to
play by the new rules. Shrewdly omitted, however, is a dis-
cussion of the repercussions of a free-market economy. In the
United States for example, these consequences include a large
growth in the underclass, a high poverty rate (in 1987 the pov-
erty rate was 13.6%), a widespread homelessness (perhaps 3 mil-
lion Americans are homeless), and under- and unemployment,
and a deterioration in the public infrastructure (Karger and
Stoesz, 1990).
The Realities of the Global Economy
and the Welfare State
The reality of the global economy stands in sharp contrast to
the promises of its proponents. Moreover, much of the growth
of modern corporations is not based on real growth, but on
enormous debt in the form of junk bonds, mergers, acquisitions,
and leveraged buyouts. The global economy has also ushered
in subtle changes in the perception of corporations by stock-
holders, corporate executives, and boards of directors. 1 The tra-
ditional corporation which concentrated on making money by
producing a product, is being replaced by the corporation more
concerned with its value to competitors and speculators than
with its actual production. Hence, many Chief Executive Offi-
cers (CEOs) see the value of their corporations mainly in terms
of their worth to Wall Street speculators, competitors, and deal
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makers. Even many small entrepreneurs view the success of
their companies in terms of finding a corporate buyer.
To ensure survival in a competitive world economy, cor-
porations must make their operations more efficient and more
profitable, a strategy which often includes expensive mergers
and other forms of horizontal and vertical economic integra-
tion. Hence, CEOs and boards of directors are compelled to
borrow huge sums of money at high interest rates or promise
investors high rates of return. This leads to an emphasis on
short-term profits at the expense of long-term corporate goals.
The focus on short-term profit forces corporations to cut back
on capital equipment, defer plant modernization, and may re-
sult in a significant employee reductions. While the ostensible
reason for a short-term profit approach is the need to compete
in the global marketplace, this tactic eventually leads to less
competitive corporations.
Excessive corporate debt has several consequences for the
welfare state. For one, high corporate debt-and the write-off
of interest payments-produces less governmental revenues.
Moreover, government must freeze or lower tax rates because of
the fiscal vulnerability resulting from high corporate indebted-
ness. The inherent anti-tax bias of the global marketplace means
that government cannot easily raise individual taxes, especially
using progressive taxation. On the other hand, the requirements
of the business sector for new infrastructures such as roads,
advanced communications systems, and public facilities, forces
government to plunge deeper into deficit spending in order to
provide services for economic growth. Caught in this economic
vise, government must cut back on both critical services and
infrastructure. Education is pared back, social services are cut,
and less important secondary roads are left to deteriorate. De-
spite these cutbacks, increased public and corporate demands
requires government to resort to even heavier borrowing and
deficit spending, thus repeating the cycle.
The scope of deficit spending in the United States is difficult
to grasp. While the Gross National Product (GNP) of the U.S.
was $5 trillion in 1989, the budget deficit was $3 trillion. In
other words, the federal budget deficit equalled three-fifths of
the GNP in 1989. Seen in another way, the world traded a total
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of $2.7 trillion worth of goods in 1988, less than the $2.83 trillion
federal budget deficit in late 1989. By creating an enormous debt
(from about $50 billion a year in the Carter term to between
$145 to $200 billion a year in the 1980s), Reagan paralyzed the
growth of public services well into the next century. This federal
debt has made new fiscal-based social welfare programs almost
inconceivable in the near future, regardless of social problems
(Moynihan, 1989).
The need to repay high interest loans requires corporations
to restructure their operations. This corporate rationalization of-
ten includes the downscaling of production, a process which
may involve laying-off large numbers of workers. In addition,
corporations often replace full-time employees with less ex-
pensive part-time workers who are ineligible for normal em-
ployment perks, including health and pension benefits. These
conditions promote the establishment of an underclass of low-
wage employees. For example, although 20 million new jobs
were created in the 1980s, they were not with the Fortune 500
companies, who cut their work forces by 35 million. Many of the
new jobs created in the 1980s were low-paying service positions
in the secondary labor market (Friedrich, 1990). Thus, despite a
6% unemployment rate, over 44% of the jobs created in the U.S.
between 1979 and 1985 paid less than $7,400 per year (Harring-
ton, 1987). Instead of achieving economic self-sufficiency, many
workers in these low-paying jobs remain eligible for basic wel-
fare benefits. In this way, government tacitly assumes the social
costs of corporate competition in the new global economy.
An unstable labor market results in less tax revenues while
contributing to greater pressures on unemployment compensa-
tion programs. For example, in 1989 only 31% of the short-term
unemployed in the U.S. received benefits, a figure which com-
pares unfavorably to the 75% who received benefits in the 1970s
(Shapiro & Greenstein, 1988). Moreover, laying off or terminat-
ing workers affects merchants, banks, landlords, and the tax
base of local and national governments. Taken together, these
trends lead to greater challenges for the welfare state, eventually
influencing a deterioration in the basic interpersonal and group
structure. For example, previous studies have linked economy-
related changes to an increase in mental illness and suicide rates
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(Feather & Davenport, 1981; Platt, 1984; Brenner, 1984) and a rise
in the crime rate (Thornberry & Christenson, 1984).
The technological revolution, another important part of the
global economy, requires new equipment and a comprehensive
retraining of the workforce. Many American corporations, how-
ever, are reluctant to invest in retraining, arguing instead that it
is a governmental responsibility. Faced with a huge deficit, the
federal government can not afford the costs of retraining large
segments of the workforce. Citing a shortage of skilled workers,
this stalemate becomes another excuse for corporations to move
their manufacturing offshore. Thus, government's fiscal paraly-
sis encourages capital flight, and instead of assuring prosperity,
it helps create a fiscal crisis of the state.
Labor policy is another factor in the global economy. Corpo-
rations demand a loose labor market-high levels of unemploy-
ment-in order to bring down or stabilize wage rates and lower
inflation. As part of this strategy, employers argue for loosening
labor market controls while curbing the power of unions. This
corporate strategy can result in a decline in both the strength
and numbers of trade unions. For example, in 1945 roughly
35% of the U.S. work force was unionized, by 1986 that num-
ber had dropped to 17.5% (Karger, 1988). A decline in union
strength is often correlated with diminished levels of employee
security.
This labor policy has other ramifications. Thomas Donahue
(1989), Secretary Treasurer of the American Federation of Labor
(AFL-CIO) argues that:
[There is a] trend toward replacing long-term employees
with part-time and temporary ones who have no personal
stake in the company's success, no permanent home work-
place, only the most transitory and superficial relationships
with their fellow workers, and-of course-no regular ben-
efits, vacations, holidays, or company life and health in-
surance plans, and no retirement benefits at the end of a
working lifetime. If that trend prevails, there's a serious
danger that a large piece of our society will be split three
ways: At the top, a highly paid professional, managerial
and technical group, made smaller and more tightly knit by
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computer networks. Next, a layer of outside contractors pro-
viding materials and services that the corporate elites would
rather buy than provide in-house. And at the bottom, doing
the work, a permanent floating population of rootless func-
tionaries, moving from job to job or to the unemployment
line, who would be closer to the Marxist idea of a dispos-
sessed proletariat than anything that America has seen so
far. (p. 6)
The creation of a large lumpen proletariat presages greater
dilemmas for an already overextended welfare state. Because
low-paid and marginal workers have few of the traditional em-
ployment perks and protections accorded a stable workforce,
they require more social welfare benefits, including various
forms of income support. Moreover, with few retirement bene-
fits and insufficient incomes to create their own retirement plan,
this group will likely consume high levels of welfare benefits
when they retire. By allowing corporations to create a floating
labor force, government agrees to strain its present resources
while mortgaging its future.
Laissez-faire labor policies also encourage greater income
inequality. For example, in 1960 the average CEO was paid 41
times more than a shop floor worker; by 1988 that CEO earned
91 times more than the factor worker (Donahue, 1989). Between
1973 and 1984, families with incomes over $50,000 per year
increased from 14.9% to 15.6%. During that same period, the
proportion of families with incomes below $20,000 increased
from 32.1% to 36.4%. These changes occurred while the tradi-
tional middle class-families with incomes of between $20,000
to $50,000 per year-fell from 53% to 47.9% (Bradbury, 1986).
The economic gap between upper- and lower-income American
families was wider in 1987 than at any time since the Census
Bureau began recording this data (Karger & Stoesz, 1989).
The rich were getting richer while real earnings for most
Americans either stagnated or fell. While the yearly earnings
of the top 20% of American families rose (after adjusting for
inflation) more than $9,000 (to almost $85,000), the income of
the bottom 20% dropped by $576 (to $8,800) (Friedrich, 1990).
Examining family income over an eleven year period provides
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even bleaker figures. From 1973 to 1984 the incomes of the poor-
est fifth with children fell 34%. It is estimated that from 1980 to
1984, there was a net transfer of $25 billion in income from poor
and middle-income families to the richest fifth of the population
(Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1988).
While the salaries of top management dramatically in-
creased, many of these managers lobbied to keep the minimum
wage as far below the poverty line as possible. In fact, since 1981
the minimum wage remained stagnant while the cost of living
has substantially risen. These figures have enormous impact for
the welfare state, since not only is the number of people eligible
for entitlement programs growing, but much of the clientele of
these programs were once middle-class.
While alarming to liberals, monetarists and supply-side
economists argue that income inequality is a socially desirable
phenomenon. For these economists, social policies that promote
income equality encourage coercion, limit individual freedom,
and damage the economy. Furthermore, income inequality is
seen as the desirable outcome of the marketplace-it reflects
differences in rewards based on individual talent and initiative.
According to these economists, income differentials provide an
incentive to work hard for an otherwise unmotivated labor force
(Walker, 1990).
Policies designed to foster corporate competition in the glo-
bal economy affect the welfare state. While government ar-
rests personal and corporate tax rates,2 the economic dislocation
caused by plant shut-downs, erratic employment, and low wage
scales results in increased numbers of people eligible for so-
cial welfare programs. 3 Even if corporate profits are higher and
governmental revenues greater, the negative consequences of
economic reorganization cancel out much of the positive effects
of revenue growth. In short, the effects of unregulated economic
change occur at a faster rate than governmental revenues can
remedy, and the social welfare activities of the state fall short of
the needs and expectations of its most vulnerable constituents.
Several future scenarios are possible given the realities of the
global economy.
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Future Scenarios for the Welfare State
The following scenarios for the welfare state seem plausible
given current trends: (a) the attenuation of welfare programs
through neglect and fiscal attrition, (b) the creation of a corpo-
rate welfare state, and (c) the revitalization of welfare programs
in response to increased social problems.
The first scenario suggests that current trends in welfare will
continue. Ramesh Mishra (1984) identifies three factors that sig-
nal a crisis in the welfare state: (a) a fiscal crisis of the state (a
decrease in social welfare expenditures) and a cutback in welfare
benefits, (b) a continuation of the political philosophy that views
welfare expenditures as a barrier to economic growth, and (c) a
crisis of legitimation (the loss of confidence in the welfare state
to solve social problems). If adverse trends continue, an attrition
of welfare state functions will build upon itself and eventually
immobilize the welfare state. As social problems endemic to the
global economy increase, and as welfare programs are curtailed,
the belief that the welfare state is ineffective in addressing social
problems will gain greater currency. These currents will climax
when the welfare state is delegitimized and arguments for its
continued existence become indefensible. At that point, disman-
tling the bulk of welfare state programs will become a mechan-
ical task. Replacement programs or strategies-if any- that
would supersede the welfare state are open to speculation. In
effect, this scenario presupposes a political economy modelled
on a laissez-faire framework. Given the economic insecurities
faced by the middleclass, and the dependence of this group on
key social welfare programs (e.g., social security, student loans,
and housing and mortgage assistance), this scenario is unlikely.
A second scenario suggests that the growth in multinational
corporations will eventually lead to a corporate welfare state.
Within this scenario, economically powerful corporations will
provide direct benefits to their employees, including generous
retirement benefits, health care, and personal social services.
Employees lucky enough to work for multinational corpora-
tions will be protected under this umbrella, while workers in
the secondary labor market will be covered under governmen-
tal welfare programs. Because fewer people will be beneficiaries
of the government's largesse, less revenues will be needed.
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The realization of this scenario is unlikely. For one, few
precedents exist for corporations to assume, on a wholesale ba-
sis, the responsibility for meeting the full range of their employ-
ees needs. While some corporations provide in-house employee
assistance programs (Akabas & Kurzman, 1982; Googins, 1975;
Googins & Godfrey, 1987), including mental health and day
care services, the provision of comprehensive corporate social
welfare benefits has not been adopted on a widespread basis.
Moreover, given the corporate strategy of replacing full-time
employees with part-time workers, it seems doubtful that corpo-
rations are on the verge of starting massive health, welfare, and
economic security programs. Furthermore, since corporations
must be lean to survive in a competitive global economy, the
prospects of establishing expensive social welfare programs ap-
pears remote. In short, while benevolent corporations were pos-
sible when American business had secure economic standing-
little competition, low debt, and unlimited markets-it is not
realistic to expect generous corporate entitlements in a highly
competitive global economy.
The last scenario suggests that welfare state functions will
be revitalized as increased social problems threaten the stability
of industrialized nations. The welfare state could be revived us-
ing several different strategies. For one, welfare activities would
receive more resources as social instability grows and economic
problems become worse. Secondly, the welfare state could be
strengthened through what Mishra (1984) calls "corporatism"-
the creation of a systematic framework for the integration of a
productive market economy with social welfare functions. The
corporatist welfare state is based on a consensus between im-
portant social groupings, such as government, business and la-
bor. While the nature of welfare remains the same, corporatism
provides an institutional framework for maintaining full em-
ployment and comprehensive social welfare programs within
the context of a liberal free-market society.
While corporatism may be a desirable alternative to a declin-
ing welfare state, it presupposes that welfare problems can be
addressed by individual nation states rather than through a con-
certed international effort. Because the economic transformation
in Western industrialized nations is international in scope, the
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restoration of welfare activities should be based on developing
minimum universal need standards that are translated into so-
cial welfare programs. These need standards should be related
to adequate diet, shelter, clothing; health care, economic secu-
rity, and educational and economic opportunities. In addition,
developing a procedure to enforce-possibly through sanctions
and boycotts-international need standards for welfare bene-
fits diminishes the economic advantage of countries operating
without a comprehensive social welfare system.
While the future of the welfare state is generally open to
question, certain things are clear. For one, the use of Keyne-
sian solutions rooted in individual nation states is becoming
problematic for addressing social welfare problems caused by
an interdependent global economy. Specifically, the need to ar-
rest the growth in corporate and personal taxation is resulting
in governmental cutbacks even in highly developed welfare
states such as Britain, France, and Italy (Friedman, et al., 1987).
Moreover, as social problems attendant to economic dislocation
continue to rise, governmental intervention is curtailed due to
the revenue restrictions inherent in the economic makeup of
the global economy. Secondly, traditional Marxian answers-
i.e., the view that the economic system should be the primary
social welfare program by ensuring employment to anyone who
wishes to work-are largely irrelevant in a global economy
where the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries are toying
with privatization and are on the verge of joining the world eco-
nomic community.4 What is clear, however, is that conventional
approaches to the welfare state must be reconsidered in light of
the global economy. Unfortunately, there are few models that
presently address the development of a humane and efficient
welfare state that does not hinder national competitiveness in
a global economy. Ideally, compassionate welfare state models
should be developed that actively promote international com-
petitiveness rather than hinder it.
Conclusion
The new global economy has important consequences for
the welfare state. For one, the gross revenues of many multina-
tional corporations are greater than the GNP of many nations.5
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This economic strength translates into political power. For ex-
ample, corporations can blackmail local and state governments
by threatening plant closures, relocating operations offshore,
and laying off large numbers of workers. In 1982, International
Harvester began to close several of its twenty-three heavy
equipment plants. It informed Fort Wayne, Indiana, and Spring-
field, Illinois that one of the cities would have its plant shut-
down unless they bought the plant and then leased it back
to Harvester. By September 1982, each city had offered to buy
back its respective plant for $30 million or more, a significantly
higher price than the open market would bear. In October 1982,
the Fort Wayne plant was selected for closure. When Teledyne,
Inc., planned to construct a new plant employing 500 workers, it
pitted four South Carolina counties against each other. Oconee
County got the plant only by agreeing to build it and then lease
it back to Teledyne at favorable rates, something that the other
three counties were unwilling to do. These threats were repeated
in one form or another by General Motors and many other cor-
porations throughout the 1980s (McKenzie, 1984). Threats such
as these ensure that government will respond quickly, and often
positively, to corporate demands.
While a few individuals and corporations increase their for-
tunes (in 1988 the richest 1 percent in the U.S. was expected to
amass over $452 billion in pretax income), public institutions
grow poorer. Thus, instead of ensuring a healthy public and
private sector, major U.S. tax cuts and pro-corporate fiscal poli-
cies in the 1980s led to uneven economic growth (Phillips, 1990).
In effect, the private sector grew wealthier as the public sector
experienced unprecedented debt. One of the outcomes of this
public debt has been a neglected and decaying infrastructure
which, if it were now rehabilitated, would be far costlier than
if it were attended to throughout the 1980s. Moreover, given
a federal budget deficit of over $3 trillion, it seems unlikely
that the federal government can undertake a substantial renova-
tion of the American infrastructure. Hence, the American pub-
lic sector is now poorer than before the economic upswing of
the 1980s.
Perhaps the most important change resulting from the global
economy is a shift in the perception of government. Instead of
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viewing government as an arbiter of the public interest, neocon-
servatives maintain that government must stand aside and let
economic force rule. This laissez-faire philosophy implies that
corporations should exercise their economic muscle to ensure
that government does not interfere in the marketplace, except
to benefit corporate growth. The argument which calls for a di-
minished governmental role in the marketplace also applies to
social welfare programs. A philosophy which urges government
to assume a pa'.sive stance in the marketplace is inimical to the
basic tenets of the welfare state. For the neoconservatives, gov-
ernmental responsibility is not perceived as a commitment to
the interests of the larger society, but instead to the upper so-
cioeconomic classes. In essence, this philosophy is a repudiation
of more than fifty years of welfare statism.
Neoconservatives maintain that if the marketplace is left un-
fettered, the resulting economic expansion will provide govern-
ment with abundant revenues. This canard is repudiated by the
experience of the United States. After seven years of economic
recovery, the federal government is in worse shape (a huge
budget deficit, increased foreign ownership of U.S. resources, 6
an increase in poverty, and a high trade imbalance) than before
the economic upswing. Despite the economic growth of the last
seven years, the overall poverty rate in 1987 was 13.6%-higher
than any year of the 1970s, including the recession years of
1974-5 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1988).
The recent literature in social welfare policy is replete with
arguments bemoaning the changes taking place in the welfare
state since the late 1970s (Abramovitz, 1988; Block, et al., 1987;
Harrington, 1984; Katz, 1986; Piven & Cloward, 1982; Beverly
and McSweeney, 1987; Kuttner, 1987; Morris, 1986). Despite
the salience of these arguments, liberals ignore the fact that
neoconservatives are correct-the economic reality facing in-
dustrialized nations has changed and the traditional welfare
state may not be the most suitable vehicle to protect vulnerable
populations. Moreover, industrialized nations can no longer in-
dependently shape their economic future. The interdependence
of the global marketplace requires nations to interact in an en-
vironment where welfare state decisions will be made in the
context of a new economic reality.
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On the other hand, neoconservatives are wrong when they
argue that a new economic order requires nations to adopt
a laissez-faire political economy. Contrary to the pronounce-
ments of conservative pundits, no clear evidence exists that a
laissez-faire economic approach ensures success. On the con-
trary, Japan-a country experiencing economic success-has
governmental planning, restricted markets, and a labyrinth of
governmental regulations.
The debate about the economic future of industrialized na-
tions is a debate about the future of the welfare state. If neocon-
servatives are successful, the present attacks on the welfare state
will intensify. In the end, new ways of redefining the function,
role, and responsibility of the welfare state are necessary if it is
to survive in a new global economy.
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Notes
1. Although much has been written recently about the transformation of mod-
em corporations, one of the earliest voices documenting that change was
John Kenneth Galbraith (1967), who maintained that large corporations
are now controlled by the technostructure-management, scientists, and
technicians-rather than by stockholders. According to Galbraith, these
technocrats are more concerned with using their talents than with the actual
survival and profitability of the corporation.
2. While corporate taxes have increased in absolute dollars, as a percentage
of total U.S. Government revenues they have remained relatively constant
throughout the 1980s. In 1980, corporate income taxes totalled $64.6 billion,
or about 12.5% of total government revenues. While corporate taxes rose
to $219.7 billion in 1988, they still accounted for only about 13% of total
federal government revenues (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1989).
3. Although the number of families on AFDC decreased slightly from 1975
to 1984 (from 11.4 to 10.7 million families), this drop was due mainly to
eligibility changes and program cuts rather than a drop in those requiring
benefits (Karger & Stoesz, 1989).
4. The trend toward the breakup of traditional socialism in Eastern Europe
is evident in the recent reunification of Germany, and the increased move
toward economic privatization in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
to a lesser extent in Romania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union.
5. In 1977 the total assets of U.S. multinational corporations was $2.7 trillion.
By 1988 those assets had increased to $5.3 trillion, higher than the total
U.S. GNP for that year. Moreover, U.S. multinational corporations had a
combined workforce of over 26 million employees in 1988, larger than the
population of many medium-sized nations (Bureau of Economic Analysis,
1989).
6. Outlays by foreign investors to acquire or establish U.S. business enter-
prises increased from $10.8 billion in 1982 to $65 billion in 1988. Foreign
outlays have risen 55% per year during the past five years, and in 1985
they amounted to almost $1 trillion (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1989).
